BY THE WAY: J&K’s New Political Crisis – An Unfinished Government & a Waiting Opposition
If a road is not built, a job is not created, an industrial investment does not arrive, a government scheme is delayed or an administrative decision remains stuck, the political cost is borne by the elected government.
Dr Noour Ali Zehgeer
After every assembly election across India, citizens look forward to meaningful changes in their lives — better healthcare, stronger education systems, and more employment opportunities. These expectations are natural in a democracy, where people believe their vote will translate into progress. In Jammu & Kashmir, however, the story has been different. Despite repeated promises from the central government and the National Conference — which secured a thumping majority in the recently held elections — the people of this Union Territory continue to feel abandoned.
The Jammu and Kashmir is entering a new and unusually fluid phase of its political life. The political crisis unfolding in the Union Territory is no longer confined to the familiar contest between Srinagar and New Delhi, or between competing regional parties. It is now becoming a more complicated struggle over power, performance, political legitimacy and, ultimately, the question of who can offer the people of Jammu and Kashmir a credible alternative.
The political landscape has changed fundamentally since the abrogation of Article 370, the reorganisation of the erstwhile state and the restoration of an elected Assembly through the 2024 elections. The election itself sent an important political message: despite the enormous constitutional and political changes of the preceding years, the National Conference remained the principal political force in the Valley and emerged as the largest party in the Assembly. The BJP, meanwhile, consolidated much of its position in Jammu. But elections settle one question only temporarily: who forms the government. They do not necessarily settle the larger question of who actually possesses the authority to govern.
The paradox of an elected government
Omar Abdullah’s government operates within an institutional framework fundamentally different from that of a conventional state government. The Lieutenant Governor retains important responsibilities relating to police, public order and All India Services, while the elected government has responsibility for the areas assigned to it under the Union Territory’s constitutional and administrative framework. The 2024 amendments to the Transaction of Business Rules further strengthened the Lieutenant Governor’s role in these areas.
The Chief Minister is elected by the people and is expected to deliver on promises made during the election campaign. Yet some of the most consequential instruments of governance do not lie entirely within the elected government’s control. For the ordinary citizen, however, constitutional distinctions are often less important than outcomes.
If a road is not built, a job is not created, an industrial investment does not arrive, a government scheme is delayed or an administrative decision remains stuck, the political cost is borne by the elected government. This is potentially the most dangerous position for the National Conference.
The National Conference’s credibility problem
The National Conference won the 2024 election on a powerful political promise: that an elected government would restore political dignity and become an effective instrument of governance. But nearly two years into the government’s tenure, the political conversation is gradually shifting from representation to performance. The National Conference can point to the limitations imposed by the Union Territory structure, the continuing dispute over statehood, administrative constraints and the division of powers. Those are real institutional issues. Yet voters also expect a government to produce visible results despite constraints.
This is where political patience begins to run out.
The government therefore faces a double challenge. It must convince New Delhi that the elected government deserves greater authority, while simultaneously convincing the people that it can govern effectively with the authority it currently possesses. That is a difficult balancing act.
The recent uncertainty surrounding the Business Rules illustrates the problem. The J&K Cabinet approved amendments defining the respective roles of the Chief Minister, Cabinet, ministers and administrative secretaries, but the rules require the Lieutenant Governor’s notification. The issue is therefore not merely bureaucratic. It has become political.
The opposition is waiting for an opening
The National Conference’s difficulties are creating space for its opponents. The PDP, despite its diminished electoral strength, retains something the BJP does not possess in equal measure: a recognisable political identity in the Kashmir Valley and the legacy of the Mufti family. The BJP, on the other hand, possesses enormous organisational strength in Jammu and remains the dominant national political force, but its difficulty in Kashmir is equally obvious. The party has not yet been able to convert its national political appeal into an independent electoral base in the Valley. Indeed, the BJP itself is now identifying constituencies in Kashmir where it wants to build a longer-term organisational presence.
“National Conference needs to prevent either from becoming one.”
There may therefore be political conversations taking place across ideological and historical boundaries. But an alliance between the BJP and PDP is far easier to discuss than to execute. The BJP has already experienced the political costs and contradictions of governing with the PDP. The previous alliance eventually collapsed in 2018 when the BJP withdrew its support.
A party cannot negotiate from strength when it does not possess sufficient legislators to independently alter the balance of power. Any attempt to construct an alternative government would therefore potentially depend upon defections, independents or legislators willing to cross existing political boundaries. The BJP may be capable of providing the numbers and national backing required for an alternative arrangement, but it has a fundamental question of its own: who would lead such a government? The BJP does not have an obvious Valley-based Chief Ministerial alternative with the political acceptability of Mehbooba Mufti. And making the PDP the political face of a BJP-supported government would carry its own contradictions. The two parties may have reasons to talk to each other, but neither necessarily has a compelling reason to publicly marry the other.
Her daughter, Iltija Mufti, has suffered a major electoral setback, and rebuilding her political career will require more than a conventional party campaign. It will require sustained public engagement and a political issue capable of creating space against the Abdullah family’s established political network.
BJP has demonstrated considerable electoral strength in Jammu, but translating that strength into government formation in the entire Union Territory requires a much broader coalition. The BJP’s success in Jammu has also created a political incentive to expand beyond its traditional base. Its recent effort to identify constituencies in Kashmir indicates that it understands the limitation of being primarily a Jammu-based force if it wants to dominate J&K politics in the long term..
The NC, meanwhile, has a problem that is less visible but potentially more dangerous. Its greatest strength remains its historical political organisation and its deep roots in Kashmir. But an organisation that wins an election on a promise of political restoration must eventually produce visible governance. There are also signs of friction between established party structures and newer political actors. Such tensions are inevitable in a party that has returned to power after a prolonged period outside government, but they can become damaging when the government itself is struggling to demonstrate results. The Chief Minister therefore has to manage three battles simultaneously, the battle with New Delhi over powers, the battle with the bureaucracy over implementation, and the battle with the opposition over political perception. Losing any one of these battles could weaken the government. Losing all three could create the conditions for a genuine political realignment.
The missing ingredient: performance
The biggest threat to the National Conference may not actually be the BJP or the PDP. It may be public impatience. Political governments rarely collapse because of one issue. They become vulnerable when a series of disappointments begin to form a common public perception. If voters begin to believe that promises regarding development, employment, investment and governance are not being fulfilled, the opposition does not need to produce a perfect alternative. That is how political governments lose their aura of inevitability.
The Congress’s current position adds another layer to the uncertainty. In late August 2026, Congress declined an invitation to join the Omar Abdullah government, reiterating that it would stay out of the ministry until statehood is restored. This decision is significant because it leaves the National Conference with a narrower political support structure at precisely the time when it needs broader political legitimacy.
The way forward could be Centre and the elected government could find a workable understanding on administrative powers, governance and finances. The NC could then use the remaining years of its mandate to demonstrate visible development and rebuild public confidence.
The PDP could rebuild its organisation; the BJP could expand its political footprint in Kashmir and other opposition forces could begin coordinating against the NC. In such a scenario, the next Assembly election could become a direct contest over an alternative to the Abdullahs. If Nothing works out for future then BJP can play their old game based on Money, such a development would require a sufficiently large group of legislators to abandon existing political loyalties and create a new majority. Although it seems a bit impossible that remains a difficult proposition. But Indian politics has repeatedly demonstrated that political impossibilities can become possibilities when individual political interests converge.
For now, however, the numbers, leadership question and ideological contradictions make such an arrangement far from inevitable. Central leadership has to come on terms with JKNC for future of J&K and its people.
(STRAIGHT TALK COMMUNICATIONS EXCLUSIVE)
