BY THE WAY: India–Iran Relations – Navigating Complex Partnership
India–Iran relations are not about choosing sides. They are about choosing stability and foresight in a volatile region — a test of India’s maturity as a rising global power.
Dr Noour Ali Zehgeer
In 2026, 76 years have passed since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and the Republic of India. All these years, political and economic ties between them have been progressively developing despite differences in administrative regimes and in the foreign policy priorities of both countries. In the 1960s–70s, despite the close relations of Delhi with the Soviet Union, United States of America and Tehran, the Shah of Iran repeatedly paid visits to India, and same was reciprocated by Indian Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai during their visits to Tehran. In numerous speeches, they noted the close civilizational commonality of their peoples, rooted in the distant past.
For example, the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, emphasised that “few peoples are so closely related in their origin and have such close historical ties as the peoples of India and Iran” (Nehru, 1980). The period includes the beginning of Iranian-Indian cooperation in the field of energy.
In the second half of the 1960s,
The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) took an active part in the creation of an oil refinery in the city of Chennai. It is worth noting that until recently Nastran Intertrade Co Ltd, which is a subsidiary of NIOC, owns a 15 percent stake in Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited, formerly known as Madras Refineries Limited (Tourangbam, 2009). The export of Iranian oil to India began to grow every year and with it the trade turnover between the two countries grew.
In 2003–2004 it amounted to 2.9 billion US dollars, in 2004-2005, 4.13 billion dollars, and in 2009-2010 it has already reached $12.83 billion. At the same time, almost 90 percent of Iranian exports to India were oil supplies, and Indian exports to Iran were mainly agricultural products (rice and tea), pharmaceuticals and organic chemicals (Nuri, 2003). Despite the fact that Iran is a natural geo-economic supplier of energy resources to India and the mutual interest in stabilising the situation in Afghanistan, relations with Delhi did not develop as successfully as Tehran wished for.
The significant obstacle was the growing dependence of the Indian leadership on Washington, which largely determined the future paradigm of Iranian-Indian relations. After the signing of the Delhi Declaration, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, stated that, “the United States has clearly expressed its concern to the Indian leadership about the Iranian policy of Delhi” (Shuja, 2006). And the administration of George W. Bush, Jr. expressed strong opposition to any pipeline projects for the supply of energy from Iran. Pressure on Delhi intensified after the decision on the need to implement the US-India global strategic partnership and the signing of documents on cooperation in the defence and nuclear spheres by Washington and Delhi. When discussing these documents in the US Congress, the legislators demanded that New Delhi prove its loyalty to Washington and vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for a resolution on the possibility of transferring the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council (Koulaei & Soltaninejad, 2014). It was not only that all ant Iranian sanctions were approved by the UN Security Council, but unilateral sanctions were also imposed by Washington. This resulted in reduction of the Imports of Iranian oil, and payments for current supplies were converted into rupees. As a result of this policy, in 2012, the Farzad B natural gas field development activity in Iran, opened by a consortium of three Indian companies ONGC Videsh, Indian Oil Corporation, Oil India Limited in 2008, was terminated in 2013 as India- Iran trade fell up to USD 7.3 billion (Kutty, 2019). The conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan for the Iranian Nuclear Program (JCPOA) in 2015 brought changes to the sanctions regime and gave a new impetus to the development of Iranian-Indian relations. Exports of Iranian oil resumed, and trade between the two countries respectively increased to $13.7 billion in 2017-2018, and in 2018-2019 reached $17.3 billion. Iran’s involvement in the implementation of Indian geopolitical initiatives, primarily aimed at deepening regional interconnectedness. A rapid development of cooperation between Iran, India and Afghanistan began with the May 2016, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Iran where he held talks with Iranian President H. Rouhani and Afghan President A. Ghani (The Times of India, 2016). As a result of which a trilateral agreement was signed on the development of the Iranian port of Chabahar. Meanwhile they also signed an agreement on the construction of the railway line Chabahar – Zahedan (Iran) – Zaranj (Afghanistan). The decision of the heads of the three states to implement a major infrastructure project linking India with the countries of Central Asia has become a landmark moment in the development of Iranian-Indian, Iranian Afghan and Indian-Afghan relations.
India and Iran share a relationship that is both strategic and sensitive, shaped by geography, energy security, and shifting global alignments. In 2026, the partnership is marked by cautious engagement: cooperation continues in areas of mutual benefit, but constraints remain due to sanctions and regional instability.
The Indo-Persian trade and cultural relations are, however, of a much older vintage, going back almost a millennium. Ashrafpur-Kichaucha, a small town located 100 km east of Lucknow in Ambedkar Nagar district, is home to the tomb of Hazrat Makhdoom Ashraf Jehangir. He is referred as found of Ashrafi branch in Chisti order and his Mazar remains as major centre of Indo-Islamic Spiritual heritage. I consider it as a blessing.
On the energy front, India’s resumption of crude and LPG imports from Iran after a sevenyear pause underscores the pragmatic need to diversify supply sources. With nearly half of India’s crude passing through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s role in securing energy corridors is indispensable. Yet, this engagement is carefully calibrated to avoid jeopardizing India’s ties with the United States, Israel, and Gulf partners.
The Chabahar Port project remains a cornerstone of India’s regional strategy. Despite sanctions slowing expansion, India’s longterm commitment reflects its determination to bypass Pakistan and secure access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Chabahar is more than infrastructure; it is a symbol of India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in West Asia.
Diplomatically, India has adopted a measured stance during recent Middle East tensions. While expressing concern over U.S.–Israel strikes on Iran and offering condolences after Ayatollah Khamenei’s assassination, New Delhi avoided direct confrontation. This balancing act reflects India’s effort to protect national interests while maintaining credibility across diverse partners.
The challenge lies in reconciling principle with pragmatism. India must safeguard its energy security and connectivity ambitions, but also uphold its reputation as a responsible global actor. Transparent communication, consistent policy, and foresight will be critical in ensuring that engagement with Iran strengthens India’s longterm strategic position without undermining other vital partnerships.
(STRAIGHT TALK COMMUNICATIONS EXCLUSIVE)
